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Introduction1
Knafo and Teschke’s polemical essay Political Marxism and the Rules of Reproduction of Capitalism has stirred up 
the Political Marxist community. The authors have thrown down the gauntlet to the early generations, 
accusing their predecessors of backsliding into deterministic readings of capitalism that betray the original 
promise of the tradition. Their intervention has started the ‘rules of reproduction debate’, for lack of a 
better name, a dispute that echoes broader debates from across the history of the social sciences. Knafo 
and Teschke’s article, for example, is heavily framed in the terms of the structure/agency debate (pp.17-8). 
This framing is unfortunate because it tends to mislead the discussion towards an ontological question – to 
what extent do agents truly enact structural change? Though not irrelevant, this is somewhat beside the 
point. The real question that Knafo and Teschke are raising is in fact methodological – why do we keep 
imagining lifeless structures as self-acting entities and how can we avoid doing so? As such, the rules of 
reproduction debate finds a better analogy in a much older (and deeper) dispute: the Methodenstreit. Do 
historical patterns justify the representation of social systems as predictable entities underpinned by 
structurally-generated logics of action? Or does this project naturalistic properties onto human phenomena? 
Does taking history seriously mean that social change can only be understood at the level of dynamic 
interactions within a specific institutional context? Or does this dissolve all theoretical explanation into 
historical description?  
Looking at the debate through this prism, my response to their essay advances three points. (1) 
The first is a critical reformulation of Knafo and Teschke’s representation of the divide within Political 
Marxism. Rather than a conflict between a ‘structuralist’ sector that has come to betray the founding 
principles and a ‘historicist’ faction that remains true to them, I argue that this duality is better understood 
as a spectrum between two different kinds of historicism that have coexisted in the tradition since the 
beginning: a structural historicism and an institutional historicism. If Knafo and Teschke perceive the existence 
of two separate ‘camps’ where there is in fact a continuum, it is because their work is situated on the far 
end of the institutional ‘wing’. (2) The second point traces the source of Knafo and Teschke’s institutionalist 
‘radicalisation’ to issues they have encountered in their respective research agendas. Situating their 
intervention against the background of their own intellectual development, I trace the evolution of their 
theoretical positions from their origins in the discipline of International Relations to the formation of the 
Political Marxism Research Group at Sussex. (3) My last point re-considers the concept of ‘market 
dependence’, which Knafo and Teschke identify as the kernel of Political Marxism’s deterministic relapse. 
Though I concur with the authors that the concept currently has a deterministic bent, I also argue that it 
can be reformulated in a way that is more amenable to institutional historicism.  
1. Structural Historicism and Institutional Historicism 
Knafo and Teschke’s article finishes by situating Political Marxism at a ‘crossroads’, as if the tradition were 
bifurcating into irreconcilable theoretical trajectories (p.25). The juncture seems to be separating two 
1 Acknowledgements go to Elisabeth Wallmann, Jack Copley, Steffan Wyn-Jones, Pedro Salgado, Michael Žmolek, Samuel Knafo, 
and Benno Teschke for reading earlier versions of this article and giving me thoughtful comments. Thanks also to Maïa Pal for 
encouraging me to intervene in this debate. 
sharply opposed camps: those who wish to remain true to the ‘historicist’ impulse of EP Thompson – a 
spiritual guide for Political Marxists – and those ‘who wish to build on a strict structuralism that emphasizes 
the logic of capitalism and its universalising features’. Implicit in this opposition is a reference to The Poverty 
of Theory, Thompson’s furious critique of Althusser, in which the historian lambasted the philosopher for 
purifying theory from history.2 Though I agree with the authors that there are indeed two different 
tendencies within Political Marxism, I want to begin my commentary by de-escalating the tensions that the 
article has generated. To do so, I think it is important to reformulate in a different way the duality that the 
authors identify.  
The opposition between ‘historicism’ and ‘structuralism’ is an unhelpful categorisation of the two 
currents within Political Marxism. In itself, the term ‘historicism’ is ambiguous as it has multiple theoretical 
meanings, some of which are antithetical to one another.3 The authors’ particular usage echoes that of 
Gramsci, for whom the term denoted a type of theory that prioritises concrete historical contexts over 
universal laws of development. Whether one chooses to speak of capitalist ‘laws of motion’ or not, I think 
it is safe to say that all Political Marxism falls within the scope of Gramscian ‘historicism’. After all, the 
bedrock of all strands of Political Marxism remains the Brenner Thesis, and in particular, its critique of neo-
Smithian theory, for treating the dynamics of capitalist development as transhistorical. At its core, the 
Brenner Thesis is nothing but a forceful reassertion of the historical materialist principle that social 
dynamics are not natural, but historically determined. The term ‘structuralism’ is equally ambiguous, as it 
can refer to a broad range of theories of structural determination. But the authors’ tacit invocation of the 
Thompson-Althusser debate has been noticed and has understandably struck a nerve. Though some 
political Marxists, like Charles Post,4 openly embrace the ‘structuralist’ label, it is nevertheless a disservice 
to equate their brand of structuralism with that of Althusser, for whom the analysis of social structures was 
essentially an exercise in armchair speculation. The ‘structuralist wing’ of Political Marxism is, by contrast, 
far from ahistorical. Needless to say, it is made up of deeply historical thinkers whose works evidence 
thorough research and empirical sophistication.  
Moreover, Knafo and Teschke’s formulation presents us with an irreconcilable division, as if both 
theoretical tendencies were radiating out of the Brenner Thesis in opposing directions. Instead, I believe it 
is more accurate to speak of a spectrum between two kinds of historicism that have coexisted in the tradition 
since the beginning: a structural historicism and an institutional historicism. Both reflect different epistemic stances 
on how historical change can be known and theorised. When explaining the dynamics of historical change, 
structural historicism tends to privilege macro-structural pressures, whereas institutional historicism tends 
to give more causal weight to specific political and institutional contexts. Rather than two camps with an 
inherently antagonistic relationship, I believe that both epistemic tendencies can be plotted along an 
imaginary continuum. If the later works of Robert Brenner are clearly on the structural side of the spectrum, 
I would argue that Knafo and Teschke are writing from the far end of the institutional side. On the one 
hand, this makes them distinctly perceptive of the theoretical differences within Political Marxism – and 
sharp commentators at that. On the other hand, their extreme epistemic position is also bound to alienate 
the bulk of Political Marxists whose works tend to hover somewhere along the middle and thus are less 
likely to perceive the sharp contradictions that the authors identify.  
In any case, both epistemic tendencies trace their source to a double argument at the heart of the 
Brenner Thesis, with each tendency leaning on one of its sides. In his famous comparative analysis of late-
medieval agrarian formations, Brenner isolated the origins of capitalism in the English enclosure, where a 
radical transformation in social property relations sparked a productive revolution in agriculture that later 
2 Thompson, 2001 [1978]. 
3 Teschke, 2014: p.3. 
4 Post et al., 2017. 
spread to manufacturing.5 To explain the birth of modern economic growth (i.e. self-reinforcing 
productivity increases) in the English countryside, Brenner made two interrelated arguments: 
(1) Brenner argued that if agrarian producers became capitalists, it was not because growing 
commercial opportunities instilled in them a greater entrepreneurial spirit, but because they were forced to 
do so in order to survive. Under feudalism, there was no reason to assume that a gradual extension of 
markets would set in motion capitalist development because the majority of the population were peasants 
in possession of their means of survival (i.e. land). Even though peasants engaged in the market to 
complement their incomes, they avoided risking their plots by prioritising their own social reproduction 
over profit, and as such, they seldom invested in risky productive innovations. If capitalism came into being, 
then, it was because the peasantry’s renewal of their means of survival became dependent upon market 
fluctuations against their will. This occurred because the lords of England succeeded in subjecting peasants 
to a land market of short-term commercial leases, which exposed them to the possibility of dispossession 
if they failed to meet constantly rising rents, thus making profit the condition of their social reproduction. 
(2) Brenner also argued that this transformation happened in England, as opposed to France or 
eastern Europe, because of the peculiarities of English feudalism and the resolution of class conflicts 
between lords and peasants in this particular context. These peculiarities, arising from the Norman conquest 
of England, evolved under the pressures of class conflict into a distinct agrarian regime in which lords had 
the capacity to subject free peasants to short-term leases and hike rents at will, effectively subjecting them 
to a competitive market for land. The unintended result of this process was the formation of large capitalist 
farms employing waged labour in the early-modern period, as successful tenants agglomerated lands and 
unsuccessful ones were outcompeted and dispossessed. These farms were in turn compelled to regularly 
invest in capital-using and labour-saving methods, setting them apart from the fragmented and stagnant 
agricultures of western continental Europe.  
There was no unresolved ‘ambiguity’ (p. 4) in this double argument. Rather, both premises were 
perfectly compatible in the case of the English transition to capitalism, where the structural pressures
conducive to capitalist development (market dependence) were an unintended by-product of class conflicts 
mediated by peculiar institutional conditions (English feudalism). The problem came when Political Marxists 
sought to extract theoretical lessons to examine capitalist development beyond England. On the one hand, 
some countries transitioned to capitalism without replicating the English model of competitive tenant 
farming (e.g. the US), thus requiring explanations divorced from the institutional peculiarities of the English 
experience. On the other hand, the logical relationship between the emergence of market-dependent 
producers and capitalist development was not always clear outside of England (e.g. Netherlands), thus 
problematising the explanatory power of market dependence. This was all further complicated by the 
extension of Political Marxism into realms with an oblique relationship to capitalist production (e.g. 
geopolitics, finance), which raised a whole host of different questions. To address these dilemmas, authors 
within the Political Marxist tradition came to place varying degrees of emphasis on one of the two sides of 
the Brenner Thesis, either structural pressures or institutional specificities, gradually giving rise to two 
historicist tendencies.  
Drawing most inspiration from the first argument of the Brenner Thesis, the structural historicist 
tendency highlights the causal determinacy of structural pressures, hence its emphasis on ‘rules of 
reproduction’. The emphasis, thus, is placed upon limits and constraints, a view exemplified by Brenner’s 
assertion that, once a specific set of social property relations become established, rational actors lock into 
‘certain limited options, indeed quite specific strategies, in order best to reproduce themselves – that is, to 
maintain themselves in their established socio-economic positions’.6 Likewise, for Post all sets of social-
property relations 
5 Brenner, 1976, 1985.  
6 Brenner, 1985: p.213. 
have strong laws of motion/‘rules of reproduction’ which produce distinctive patterns of growth 
and crisis, and distinctive forms of class struggle. It is in phases of crisis that conflictual class 
relations are intensified, opening the possibility (not necessity) of systemic-modal transitions – the 
emergence of new social property relations as the unintended consequence of attempts by 
producers and appropriators to reproduce their social position.7
In the analysis of capitalism, this epistemic tendency has logically turned toward higher levels of abstraction, 
seeking answers in a general theory of market dependence and its associated laws of motion (i.e. 
competition, specialisation, productivity gains). For the structural historicist tendency, formalising a degree 
of structural determination is an irreducible condition for any theory worth its salt: ‘[we need] 
a structuralism that allows us to understand the limits and possibilities of historical evolution and variation’.8
The view of historical change that arises from this understanding of the rules of reproduction is a 
suspend and resume model of systemic rhythms. The historical process is congealed into long phases of 
stability, in which the autonomy of social actors is overridden by systemic constraints, which impose laws 
of their own until the social system in question exhausts itself of its own accord, resulting in cyclical 
breakdowns that require systemic restructurings. In these interstitial moments, the plasticity of history 
resumes and windows of political agency open up, creating possibilities for extraordinary change. But when 
a new systemic arrangement crystallises, the window closes until the system’s internal contradictions bring 
about the next crisis. This perspective situates structural historicism within a broader paradigm of Marxian 
systems theories, with echoes of the regulation school or world-systems theory – with a degree of structural 
determination somewhere between the two. It is telling that Brenner challenged world-systems theory (and 
dependency theory more broadly) for underestimating the potential for socialist transformation in the 
West,9 but criticised the French regulation school for overestimating the change brought about by the 
Fordist class consensus.10
 By contrast, the institutional historicist tendency grew out of the second argument of the Brenner 
Thesis, giving political and institutional contingencies a more salient role in the explanation of historical 
change. The emphasis here is less about limits and constraints and more about strategy and contingency. In 
these accounts, the ‘laws of motion’ soften into developmental tendencies and dynamics, giving a greater 
intervening role to creative agencies and institutions that cannot be easily extracted out of their context. An 
example of this line of thought would be Ellen Meiksins Wood’s contribution on the Dutch transition, in 
which she argued, against Brenner, that the sixteenth-century peasants of the Netherlands were indeed 
market dependent but not capitalist, as they lacked additional institutional conditions capable of setting in 
motion and sustaining competitive imperatives (more on this later).11 Another example would be George 
Comninel’s work on English feudalism, where he traced the appearance of capitalist production to the legal 
peculiarities of common law, which allowed the enclosure to remove agriculture away from the purview of 
customary regulations.12 For the institutional historicist tendency, generic structural conditions like market 
dependence are necessary for understanding capitalism, but they are also insufficient and need to be 
complemented with concrete factors that are typically context-bound, thus forcing them to operate on 
lower levels of abstraction.  
These accounts do not deny the existence of structural pressures nor the extraordinary 
transformative potential of crises, but they do provide a more malleable perspective of historical change 
that does not preclude that the rules of the game might change while the system is up and running. Structural 
factors are understood in terms of path-dependencies, which implies an admission that it becomes increasingly 
7 Post et al., 2017. 
8 Post et al., 2017. 
9 Brenner, 1977. 
10 Brenner & Glick, 1991. 
11 Wood, 2002b. 
12 Comninel, 2000. 
difficult to reverse course once history ventures down a particular path – but it is also not impossible. The 
focus thus shifts away from scheduled systemic rhythms and towards continuous creative agencies. This 
explains Knafo and Teschke’s insistence – at least in earlier versions of the article – that the concept of 
‘rules of reproduction’ should be replaced with the more open-ended notion of ‘strategies of reproduction’. 
Methodologically, this strand of Political Marxism shares greater parallels with historical institutionalism 
than with systems theories. 13  Historical institutionalism emerged in the 1970s and 80s in reaction to the 
positivist use of scientific modelling in the social sciences, arguing that social actors could only be examined 
in relation to their historical context.14 Imbued with a strong distrust of structural functionalism, historical 
institutionalists sought to explain social change through the historical layering of institutions. In the 1990s, 
this coalesced into a research agenda focused on explaining forms of institutional variation (divergence) as 
opposed to structural uniformity (convergence). All of this evidently chimes well with Knafo and Teschke’s 
positions. Tellingly, the authors describe Brenner’s structuralist turn as the moment when ‘institutions took 
a back seat’ (p.8), with market dependence becoming a way of avoiding the hard work of ‘determin[ing] 
what type of society or context people are operating in’.  
It must be stressed that Knafo and Teschke’s institutionalist bent does not automatically place 
them outside of Marxism. Historical institutionalism is generally associated with Weberian historical 
sociology, but this has not prevented the formation of very effective syntheses with Marxism in the past  
(the works of Dylan Riley or Wolfgang Streeck come to mind). Moreover, one does not need to leave the 
confines of Marxism to find that similar debates between ‘structural’ and ‘institutional’ sensibilities have 
already played out in other corners of historical materialism. A relevant example is the land rent debate.15
In the 1970s, Marxist geographers were engaged in theoretical disputes over how to conceptualise surplus 
extraction through land – a commodity with a price but no value – as well as its role in capitalist 
coordination and accumulation. Intense disagreements over the rent question prompted an epistemic split, 
with approaches to the issue moving in opposing directions. Some took a nomothetic path, moving towards 
higher levels of abstraction and seeking to theorise rent in relation to the general laws of capital 
accumulation; the work of David Harvey being the foremost example of this. Others expressed scepticism 
at the possibility of a general theory of rent and instead went down an ideographic path, turning towards 
concrete analyses of class relations and historical contexts. The greatest representative of the ideographic 
turn was Michael Ball, whose ‘structures of provision’ approach resembles Knafo and Teschke’s epistemic 
stance. The comparison, however, should sound a note of caution. The structures of provision approach 
has inspired (and continues to inspire) fine-grained Marxist analyses of great quality.16 However, it also 
carries an empiricist drift, one that Ball himself was unable to resist. Over time, his work shed layers of 
theory,  jettisoning any mentions of Marxism or any other critical theory until it blended into institutionalist 
economics in the 1990s.  
2. Historicising Knafo and Teschke 
If, as I have argued above, the two tendencies within Political Marxism are simply different expressions of 
an epistemic continuum that has existed since the beginning, then Knafo and Teschke cannot be said to be 
returning Political Marxism to its origins. Rather, they are stretching its institutional side to new limits. In 
fact, I believe that their impulse to do so owes less to the Brenner Thesis and more to the evolution of their 
own research agendas. In particular, it was the difficulty to redeploy Political Marxism, an approach that 
13 It must be qualified that historical institutionalism is an epistemically diverse tradition as well. The similarity here refers to those 
strands of historical institutionalism emphasising that institutions are malleable fields of struggle, as opposed to devices for 
reproduction. Knafo and Teschke would also take issue with historical institutionalism’s tendency to fall back on ideotypical 
formulations (for a critique of Weberian ideal-types, see Teschke, 2003: p.50-1). 
14 Steinmo & Thelen, 1998:5-10. See also Streeck & Thelen, 2005.  
15 Haila, 1990.  
16 For example, Ball’s (1981) own work on the emergence of capitalist housebuilding.  
was largely devised to historicise capitalist production, onto areas of research that only have an oblique 
relationship to production, what compelled them to devise theoretical innovations. Let us turn the tables 
by placing Knafo and Teschke’s intervention against the backdrop of their own intellectual development.  
It is telling that both authors went into Political Marxism through the discipline of International 
Relations, which during their formative years was undergoing a simultaneous process of decomposition and 
creative ferment. The Realist tradition had long dominated the field, casting a Hobbesian perspective on 
international politics that insisted on the timeless necessity of violence and war due to the lack of a global 
Leviathan to keep order. The sudden capitulation of the Soviet bloc disoriented the Realists, who could not 
explain such a sweeping restructuring of the global order without a significant conflict between the great 
powers. This emboldened critical scholars to settle accounts with the discipline, with many targeting its 
positivist bent – the pretence of ‘discovering’ naturalistic laws purported to have predictive power. Those 
inspired by Marxism highlighted that IR lacked an understanding of history (to which they only turned to 
handpick facts that confirmed their biases) and of the global economy (which they saw as entirely separate 
to geopolitical concerns). These criticisms led to a widening separation between IR’s critical undercurrents, 
with some turning to historical sociology to understand geopolitical relations, and others towards political 
economy to understand the relationship between state power and global capital. This eventually resulted in 
the formation of distinct disciplines: International Historical Sociology and International Political 
Economy, which today house the research of Teschke and Knafo, respectively. Within these growing fields, 
both authors utilised Political Marxism to explore research topics with an oblique relationship to capitalist 
production: geopolitics and finance. Here, capitalism’s ‘rules of reproduction’ proved of limited use for 
their respective research agendas, pushing them to stretch Political Marxism in new directions.  
After spending some time working directly under Robert Brenner in Los Angeles, Teschke’s 
intellectual project culminated in his book The Myth of 1648.17 The Myth challenged both IR and neo-
Weberian historical sociology alike by arguing that historical patterns of geopolitical competition ought to 
be grounded in their underlying class dynamics. To do so, Teschke deployed Brenner’s concept of social 
property relations to interpret the historical evolution of European polities and their concomitant forms of 
geopolitical interaction. The book intervened, and contributed to shape, IR’s post-positivist turn by 
refocusing international theory away from timeless laws and towards historical contexts. In hindsight, The
Myth’s concluding chapters already hinted at the ‘radicalisation’ of Teschke’s epistemic stance. On the face 
of it, the book sat well with Marxism’s insistence on the historical specificity of capitalism: Teschke revealed 
how certain geopolitical conducts presumed to be transhistorical (e.g. ‘power balancing’) were in fact the 
product of a modern grand strategy tied to the capitalist transformation of British imperial power. But upon 
closer inspection, The Myth also pointed out something much more indigestible for Marxist IR: the 
emergence of the modern states-system did not map well onto the spread of capitalist development.18 In 
other words, capitalism and modern geopolitics have distinct historical origins, and thus their relationship 
is contingent and not functionally straightforward.  While this does not dispute that the rise of capitalism 
had an explicable impact on the modern states system – the imperial ascent of Britain’s fiscal-military state 
being the most evident – it does call into question the existence of generically capitalist geopolitics that can 
be theorised out of the logic of capital. Teschke would soon highlight the ‘profound variations in capitalist 
international orders’ which can only be understood through ‘the contested construction of diverse projects 
of territorialization by historically situated capitalist classes and states’.19 From there on, Teschke was set 
on course towards the depths of Political Marxism’s institutional wing.  
Working under the supervision of George Comninel at York University, Knafo’s doctoral thesis 
traced the establishment of the gold standard in capitalist Britain and its relationship to modern financial 
17 Teschke, 2003.  
18 Teschke, 2003:249. 
19 Teschke with Lacher, 2007: pp.566, 578. This theoretical move was first made explicit in his Deutscher Memorial lecture 
during the 2004 Historical Materialism conference, see Teschke (2005).  
governance; a study that would provide the basis for his book, The Making of Modern Finance.20 The nascent 
discipline of International Political Economy, then focused on theorising the oppositional relationship 
between states and markets, saw the gold standard as the origin of a liberal form of governance that imposed 
constraints upon states through automatic market mechanisms, presumably due to the growing power of a 
capitalist class keen on limiting the reach of government over their affairs. By contrast, Knafo rehistoricised 
the gold standard to show that it was in fact the product of a distinct project by the British state to exert 
leverage over market actors. Building on a long path-dependent history of sound monetary policy, the gold 
standard equipped the first capitalist state with capacities to intervene in the economy in ways that, if 
anything, prefigured the Keynesian revolution rather than its antithesis.21 What others had interpreted as a 
familiar story of structural constraints, Knafo reformulated as one of strategy and unintuitive change.  
In the meantime, he developed a take on the structure/agency question that would later become 
the kernel of the ‘rules of reproduction’ debate. Echoing the ‘epistemic debate’ raging in IR, Knafo argued 
that Marxism was caught in impossible ‘quantum leaps’ between the claims that class agency is the motor 
of history and that capitalism is a self-propelling system.22 Moreover, he argued that this ambivalence 
between agency and structure could not be shrugged off by simply finding the right balance between the 
two, for any such equivalence carries in-built an inevitable drift towards the reification of social structures 
as self-acting entities: ‘[o]nce the primary focus is placed upon structures or laws, it becomes impossible to 
explain how subjects can instantiate and act according to a previously defined objective dynamic’.23 The 
result is a confirmation bias through which vital complexities of the historical process are lost to a 
preordained script.  
To correct this, Knafo opted for a rigorous focus on agency, a term which he does not use to speak 
of ‘free will’, but strategy and contingency. For Knafo, agency is not about how agents escape social 
structures, but about how they engage with each other through social structures, irrespective of whether an 
agent’s actions end up being structurally constrained or not. In other words, Knafo’s ‘agentialism’ is not the 
product of a naïve voluntarism (i.e. social actors can always do whatever they want) but a vigilant methodological 
principle designed to prevent the scholar from representing structures as self-reproducing ‘things’. The point 
is not to deny the existence of social structures, but to avoid projecting auto-generative properties onto 
them, something that requires casting light on how agents are constantly devising strategies to reinforce 
and reproduce structures just as much as to subvert and renegotiate them. This method was bound to clash 
with the idea that social systems can be known through a predetermined set of rules of reproduction.  
If the early works of Knafo and Teschke already shared a strong inclination towards political 
Marxism’s institutionalist themes (e.g. strategy, contingency, path-dependency), their simultaneous 
settlement at the University of Sussex in the mid-2000s seems to have only reinforced these tendencies. 
Over the last decade, Teschke has moved on to explore ‘the wide diversity in the construction of foreign 
policies and spatial orders since the early eighteenth century onwards until now’.24 This carries a tacit 
departure from the macroscopic perspective on social property relations that shaped The Myth. Teschke has 
come to see the focus on the domestic composition of the polities that constitute an international order as 
tending towards ‘functional explanations of international politics that suppress the efficacy of foreign policy 
making and multilateral diplomatic agency’.25 Instead, he has refocused his work around the autonomy of 
the (geo)political, re-embedding ‘statecraft, foreign policy, and diplomacy in dense institutional contexts 
and conceiv[ing] them as situated inter-subjective practices’.  
This turn was reinforced by a growing theoretical gulf with his former supervisor, Justin Rosenberg, 
who is now also based at Sussex. Rosenberg has fleshed out Trotsky’s notion of ‘Uneven and Combined 
20 Knafo, 2013.  
21 Knafo, 2006: p.90. 
22 Knafo, 2002, 2010. 
23 Knafo, 2002: p.146. 
24 Teschke et al., 2016. 
25 Teschke, 2019:128-9. 
Development’ (UCD) into a distinct approach to International Historical Sociology.26 This approach 
explains historical change by examining how the interactions between societies at different stages of 
development (unevenness) compels ‘backward’ societies to catch-up with more ‘advanced’ ones 
(combination), which come under great pressure to maintain a leading position in the institutional and 
technological frontier. If Rosenberg’s early works had a Political Marxist flavour,27 the UCD turn towards 
transhistorical abstraction prompted Teschke’s sharp criticisms, resulting in a sustained rivalry that has 
arguably only radicalised his historicist positions.28
In the meantime, Knafo has turned his attention towards contemporary US capitalism, sharpening 
his focus on creative agencies by teasing out the managerial underpinnings of financialisation and 
neoliberalism. His recent work on ‘shareholder value’ – the corporate practice of privileging the inflation 
of company stock prices – echoes the logic of his reasoning on the gold standard.29 Whereas political 
economists tend to frame the emergence of shareholder value as an expression of the growing constraints 
imposed upon managers by speculative financiers, Knafo (and his former student Sahil Dutta) have traced 
its origins to efforts by US managers to revolutionise corporate strategy. In the 1960s, a small number of 
conglomerates began to use innovations in US finance to leverage new tactics based on aggressive takeovers 
and asset-stripping. These new tools for financing corporate growth required a more active manipulation 
of shareholders by managers, eventually leading to a reorganisation of corporate governance around the 
financial performance of company stock.  
Alongside, Knafo has continued to develop his methodological approach.30 Importantly, Knafo 
has come to abandon the concept of ‘the market’ altogether, arguing that it is too loaded with assumptions 
that obscure the concrete workings of capitalist practices.31 An example of this line of thought is his work 
on the origins of neoliberalism, in which him and a number of Sussex doctoral students have disturbed the 
traditional narrative, which centres on the projects of a ‘neoliberal thought collective’ to ‘unleash’ markets 
from government intervention.32 Regardless of the ideology and rhetoric displayed by politicians after the 
1980s, the authors argue that the concrete practices of neoliberal government (e.g. New Public Management 
techniques) were devised in the preceding period by the US military to empower managers, and precisely 
to plan the allocation of resources rather than to intensify competition. This fine-grained complexity, 
however, was missed out by macro-structural perspectives that tend to represent neoliberalism as a generic 
expansion of market activity.   
The radicalisation of Knafo and Teschke’s theoretical stance over the last decade coincides with 
the formation with their doctoral students of the Political Marxism Research Group at Sussex (PM Group), 
which has allowed them to cultivate a school of thought that has expanded the tradition’s institutional 
flank.33 In its decade of life, the PM Group has acted as a forum to organise reading sessions, invite political 
Marxist scholars to deliver seminars, and hold debates about their work. The critique of the rules of 
reproduction was first presented to the PM Group in 2013 (then under the title Political Marxism and the 
Question of Method), prompting successive waves of discussion that have shaped the article’s multiple 
different versions. This sustained inquiry into Political Marxism’s ‘state of the art’ is what has allowed Knafo 
and Teschke to push the tradition’s limits to what sometimes seems like breaking point.  
3. The Vexed Question of Market Dependence
26 Rosenberg, 2006. See also Anievas and Nişancıoğlu, 2015 
27 Rosenberg, 1994. 
28 Teschke, 2014. Alternatively, for an excellent critique of UCD from the structural wing of Political Marxism, see Post, 2018. 
29 Knafo & Dutta, 2019. 
30 Knafo, 2017. 
31 Knafo, 2020. 
32 Knafo et al., 2018. 
33 The original cohort was formed by Maïa Pal, Steffan Wyn-Jones, Matthieu Hughes, and Can Cemgil.  
Having pushed Political Marxism’s institutional flank to new limits, Knafo and Teschke have developed a 
heightened perception of the tensions within Political Marxism. At the heart of their critique lies the concept 
of market dependence, which the authors identify as a major source of determinist bias. This is not the first 
time that this concept becomes a locus of conflict within the tradition. The question of market dependence 
was already at the core of the Brenner-Wood dispute on the Dutch transition, which was arguably the first 
time that the contours of the structural-institutional divide became evident. Disagreements over market 
dependence have continued to reverberate over time, though not explicitly – they usually flare up in the 
form of competing narratives of specific transitions.34 However, with their critique, Knafo and Teschke 
(p.7-9; 12-5) have returned the question to the centre stage. They call for jettisoning the concept altogether 
(and in the case of Knafo, the very notion of ‘the market’ as well). By contrast, I believe that it can still be 
salvaged for institutional historicism, but only provided that it is reformulated in an open-ended way.   
First, an overview of the problem. As mentioned earlier, Brenner coined the concept of market 
dependence to theorise the structural conditions that forced English producers to accumulate capital in 
unprecedented ways. The lever of this process was the separation of agrarian producers ‘from their full 
means of subsistence’, regardless of whether they retained possession, if not outright ownership, of the 
means of production: ‘the key was, thus, the transformation of peasants into farmers (but not necessarily 
into proletarians, though an agricultural proletariat may have emerged at the same time or shortly thereafter, 
thereby further contributing to economic growth)’.35 In the English regime of agrarian social property 
relations, this came about when tenants were compelled to sell successfully on the market in order to renew 
their access to the land, thus pushing them out of subsistence farming by forcing them to specialise their 
production and to regularly purchase tools to improve production.36 The bottom line is that as market 
exchange comes to determine survival, producers become locked into a self-reinforcing spiral of market 
dependence, making them ‘subject to the demands of competition, increasing productivity, capital 
accumulation, and the intense exploitation of labour’.37 Brenner later redeployed the theory of market 
dependence to examine the Dutch peasantry of the sixteenth century, where he also identified an agrarian 
capitalist transformation.38 Unlike England, however, the source of market dependence in the Netherlands 
was not a competitive land market, but an environmental degradation of the countryside that reduced the 
peasantry’s capacity for subsistence. This forced them to specialise their production in the most lucrative 
crops and to purchase their staples on the market instead. 
Brenner’s take on the Dutch transition prompted disagreements amongst Political Marxists, with 
the dissenting voices being led by none other than Ellen Meiksins Wood.39 Though Wood concurred that 
the peasants of the Netherlands were indeed market dependent, she asserted that they remained commercial 
actors of a pre-capitalist type. In her carefully argued critique, she then proceeded to theorise the 
insufficiency of market dependence to explain capitalist change. Even though productive specialisation is 
certainly a feature of capitalist agriculture, she pointed out that specialisation remains an ambiguous 
indicator of capitalist development, as there have been instances of it in pre-capitalist societies that were 
not under a compulsion to improve the productive forces. When judging whether productive specialisation 
is a symptom of capitalist development or not, the point are the underlying drivers of this behaviour. In 
placing an excessive emphasis on the formal loss of the means of subsistence, Brenner had forgotten to 
elucidate whether productive competition had become an imperative or not. As Wood pointed out, Dutch 
export agriculture was based on the opportunity to import cheap grain from the Baltic, which allowed 
peasants to effectively arbitrage their subsistence costs by focusing on more lucrative crops. This, however, 
34 Arguably, the question of market dependence underlies the still undeclared debate around the Japanese transition (see Isett & 
Miller, 2016:83-92 vs. Cohen, 2019) as well as the debate around the Brazilian transition (see Carlson, 2019 vs. Salgado, 2020).  
35 Brenner, 2011: p.208. 
36 Brenner, 1985. 
37 Wood, 2002a: p.195. 
38 Brenner, 2001. 
39 Wood, 2002b. 
did not come with a compulsion to improve production, chiefly because producers remained in the 
possession of their land, allowing them to fall back on subsistence farming when market opportunities 
deteriorated. This was a luxury that the farmers across the Channel did not have. In the regime of the 
enclosure, the competitive tenant farmers of England could not simply retreat from the market in the face 
of a downturn – they had no choice but to press ahead and intensify productivity if they were to revalidate 
their leases.  
The dispute between Brenner and Wood was no small issue. The rift around market dependence 
went to the heart of the Political Marxist theory of capitalist development. For Political Marxism, the 
dynamic of self-reinforcing productivity increases unique to capitalist development cannot be explained by 
the negative removal of obstacles to the market, as if a natural propensity to exchange was always waiting 
to be laid bare. Instead, the key is to understand the creation of something new: ‘a positive compulsion to 
transform the forces of production’.40 For Brenner, capitalism’s positive compulsion essentially boils down 
to the dependence of economic actors on buying and selling for the fulfilment of their social reproduction. 
Wood’s intervention, however, problematised Brenner’s assumptions by severing the logical connection 
between market dependence and capitalist production – if market dependence can be capitalist or not, then 
it remains an ambiguous explanation of the rise of capitalism. In doing so, Wood busted wide open the 
question of what was the ‘positive compulsion’ driving the emergence of capitalism. 
Agreeing with Wood’s critique, Charles Post opted for re-theorising the concept.41 For market 
dependence to lead to capitalist development, Post argued, the ‘separation from the means of consumption’ 
(e.g. food, clothing) remains insufficient if there is not at least a potential ‘separation from the means of 
production’ as well (e.g. tools, land):  
the threat of the loss of effective possession of the main means of production in agriculture, land, 
without successful market competition – as a result of either the imposition of commercial leases 
(England) or to meet the burdens of taxes, mortgages and debts (northern US) – is necessary to 
compel household producers to specialize, innovate and accumulate independent of market 
fluctuations.42
This effectively restores market dependence (or at least a type of it) as a common structural denominator 
of capitalist production. Through this lens, one can readily identify the emergence of capitalist production 
across institutional contexts – perhaps even measure it. In his detailed study of the US transition, Post 
stresses that colonial family farmers remained pre-capitalist actors despite sometimes selling large quantities 
of agricultural products, remarking that family farms at best ‘marketed no more than 40% of their total 
output, well below the 60% that most agrarian historians believe indicates a high degree of market-
dependence’.43
Post’s reformulation of market dependence is a response to the challenge raised by Wood in a 
structural historicist way, but I believe that her intervention also carries takeaways that can be formulated 
along more institutional lines. In my reading, the problem that Wood was getting at is that peasants were 
far from insulated from market pressures in pre-capitalist societies.44 It is well-known that ‘subsistence 
agriculture’ is a misnomer: for thousands of years, the peasants of Eurasia have produced for the market to 
pay for rents, taxes, debts, or simply cultivation costs.45 Though peasant communities tended to build thick 
moral economies to blunt the sharpest effects of commercial failure, eviction from the land, and thus the 
loss of the means of production and subsistence, remained a real prospect. Of course, as Political Marxists 
40 Wood, 2002b: p.57. 
41 Post, 2002.  
42 Post, 2002: p.91. 
43 Post, 2011: p.164. 
44 Wood, 2001b: pp.54-7. 
45 Isset and Miller, 2016. 
frequently point out, commercial exchange typically performed an auxiliary rather than central role in the 
social reproduction of peasants. Even then, there were always peasants on the verge of dispossession, such 
as precarious sharecroppers or smallholders impoverished by war taxes. It would be disingenuous to say 
that actors such as these were not already market dependent, at least to some extent. The logical conclusion 
is that market dependence has always been a matter of gradations, assuming an unprecedented degree under 
capitalism. However, to admit this only raises further  conceptual problems. The Brenner Thesis criticised 
‘commercialisation theories’ for explaining the advent of capitalism as a quantitative outgrowth of age-old 
commercial practices without specifying a qualitative rupture in the logic of production.46 If a certain degree 
of market dependence is sufficient to explain capitalist dynamics, then ‘it seems hard to avoid confronting 
the quantitative question […] At what point does a quantitative difference become a qualitative one?’.47
The concept of market dependence, then, ends up reproducing the gradualist reasoning of 
commercialisation narratives. Though Wood’s article does indicate that there are at least two different kinds 
of market dependence (capitalist and non-capitalist), I believe that her reasoning was pointing beyond the 
concept altogether. As her argument progresses, market dependence quickly fades away as a sufficient 
determinant of capitalist development:  
even owner-occupiers in non-capitalist societies may not only suffer poverty but, in extreme cases, 
may even be forced to give up their land if the exigencies of inadequate land, together with the 
burdens of rent and taxation, make survival impossible. But it takes something other than the pressures of 
inadequacy to make possession dependent on competitive production. The pressures of a capitalist economy 
are such that even a prosperous farmer, like the English yeoman-tenant, is subject to them, making 
his continuing possession of good land dependent on his cost-effective production.48
In other words, while Brenner assumed a direct causal relationship between market dependence and 
competitive constraints, Wood did not.  
In doing so, Wood effectively reframed the puzzle of capitalist development around how 
competitive production is socially constructed. Her article thus proceeded to unpack the necessary 
conditions for competitive pressures to be in operation (ibid:67-9). The capitalist transformation of 
production requires the potential for price competition between suppliers, thus ruling out monopolistic or 
corporatist systems of production and exchange. Price competition also presupposes some common 
standard of measuring a social average of labour costs, whether in monetary form or otherwise, so that 
various suppliers can affect each other’s costs of production. Moreover, whereas pre-capitalist trade relies 
on exploiting price differentials across disjointed markets (e.g. arbitrage, carrying trade), capitalist 
production flourishes in conditions of relative market integration and effective transport systems, so that 
the costs and methods of production in one locale systematically affect those in another. Short of these 
‘very specific conditions, both technological and social, […] very rare until quite late in history’, it is unlikely 
that simple market dependence will be able to sustain the imperatives of productive competition (ibid:68).  
Wood’s analysis can be read as a reformulation of market dependence along the lines of 
institutional historicism. Though her article theorised the ‘irreducible conditions’ for the transmission of 
competitive imperatives, these still cannot explain what the original ‘spark’ for these imperatives is in any 
given transition. This indeterminacy can be turned into the basis of an open-ended framework, one that 
outlines the necessary conditions for capitalist development (e.g. money, market dependence, price 
competition, etc.) but that leaves an unspecified variable around the sufficient causes for this 
transformation. The underlying assumption is that what sets capitalist development in motion (its ‘positive 
compulsion’) cannot be captured by a common structural denominator because it is bound to be different 
46 Brenner, 1977. 
47 Wood, 2002b: p.55. 
48 Wood, 2002b: p.64, emphasis added. 
across geographical contexts and historical periods. Read in this light, Knafo and Teschke’s methodological 
suggestions can be reintegrated into this gap, resulting in an approach to the transition to capitalism that is 
both theoretically informed and yet versatile enough to accommodate empirical diversity. 
Knafo and Teschke, however, seem to suggest that to ‘turn the transition into a more meaty process 
beyond the very thin notion of market dependency’, the concept should be replaced for a sole focus on 
concrete ‘capitalist practices’ (p.23). The point is to trace how practices/institutions devised to transform 
the labour process are then translated across institutional contexts, influencing the creation of new practices 
in turn. This also ‘raises the prospect that applying practices developed in a different context will yield very 
different outcomes, for they are necessarily transmitted and then instrumentalised in a different way when 
introduced to a different social context with its own set of social struggles’ (p.23). While a more concrete 
focus on practices is welcome, the problem is that to identify what constitutes a ‘capitalist practice’ we still 
need a theoretically informed understanding of what capitalism is, or at least of the ‘capitalist effects’ that 
we are looking for in such practices. Moreover, it is precisely because the same practices may produce 
divergent outcomes that it is worth having a comparative sense of how structural preconditions shape the 
translation of practices. Otherwise, there is a real risk of letting all explanation slip into historical description 
– the mirror image of the reifying drift that Knafo and Teschke are seeking to combat. This is a frequent 
criticism of the authors’ position, of which they themselves are certainly aware (p.25), but which they have 
yet to seriously address.  
Conclusion 
Knafo and Teschke’s article is a provocative piece that is bound to have a lasting effect, not least on the 
followers of Brenner and Wood. Calling for a ‘radicalisation’ of Political Marxism’s historicist principles, 
Knafo and Teschke have drawn battle lines between those who want to recover the tradition’s original 
promise and those who are willing to let it drift into the economic determinism that it was meant to 
challenge. For the authors, Political Marxism has become caught in a worrying inertia that is common to 
the social sciences, which tend to err on the side of determinism because it is easier to perceive the pressures 
exerted by structural conditions than the impact of creative agencies.49 To correct this asymmetric bent, 
they suggest binding Political Marxism to a series of methodological commitments designed to prevent us 
from succumbing to a reifying gaze. As a former student of Knafo and Teschke, I am more than 
sympathetic to their approach – I frequently use their techniques in my own work – however, as I have 
argued, their critique also requires qualification.  
The duality that the authors perceive within Political Marxism is real, but their representation of it 
as a rift between ‘historicist’ and ‘structuralist’ camps is exaggerated (and unnecessarily confrontational). A 
more accurate way of imagining these differences is as a continuum between two kinds of historicism – 
institutional and structural – that have coexisted in the tradition as far back as the Brenner Thesis. In this 
light, Knafo and Teschke’s approach is a radicalisation of Political Marxism’s institutionalist sensibilities, 
and thus, rather than taking the tradition back to its origins, they are in fact charting new ground. This is 
why their ‘radical institutionalist’ position is better understood against their own intellectual development. 
Arguably, Knafo and Teschke’s post-positivist positions hardened in the midst of the ‘epistemic debate’ in 
International Relations, where the authors borrowed from Political Marxism to think historically about 
geopolitics and international finance. The oblique relationship of these research topics to production 
problematised the causal primacy of capitalist ‘rules of reproduction’ in their respective lines of research, 
thus pushing them to stretch Political Marxism in new directions. Their ‘radical institutionalism’ was then 
consolidated by the formation of the Political Marxism Research Group at Sussex, which allowed them to 
cultivate a school of thought around their views.  
49 Knafo, 2017. 
If the dispute around the Dutch transition was the first great debate traversing the Political Marxist 
tradition, the ‘rules of reproduction debate’ is arguably the second, and it is thus likely to shape subsequent 
generations of Political Marxists as much as the one that preceded it. In both cases, the dispute over specific 
concepts (market dependence and rules of reproduction) have merely acted as an entry point for much 
deeper theoretical questions that go to the heart of Political Marxism’s historicist project. Picking up where 
the debate around ‘market dependence’ left off, Knafo and Teschke suggest replacing this concept for a 
more concrete focus on ‘capitalist practices’. Revisiting the debate from an institutional historicist 
perspective, I have argued that the concept is still useful to understand capitalist transitions, but only if it is 
reformulated in a more open-ended way than what Brenner originally envisioned. This is a better solution 
than to simply dissolve the framework into an unbound analysis of institutional diffusion. Otherwise future 
Political Marxists might find themselves adrift, but in the direction of empiricism.  
Bibliography 
Ball, Michael. ‘The Development of Capitalism in Housing Provision’. International Journal of Urban and Regional 
Research 5, no. 2 (1981): 145–77. 
Brenner, Robert. ‘Agrarian Class Structure and Economic Development in Pre-Industrial Europe’. Past & Present
70 (1976): 30–75. 
———. Cores, Peripheries, and Globalization. Budapest: Central European University Press, 2011.  
———. ‘The Agrarian Roots of European Capitalism’. In The Brenner Debate: Agrarian Class Structure and Economic 
Development in Pre-Industrial Europe, 213–328. Cambridge: Press Syndicate, 1985. 
———. ‘The Origins of Capitalist Development: A Critique of Neo-Smithian Marxism’. New Left Review, I, no. 
104 (1977): 25–92. 
Brenner, Robert, and Mark Glick. ‘The Regulation Approach: Theory and History’. New Left Review 188, no. 1 
(1991). 
Carlson, Chris. ‘Rural Property Relations and the Regional Dynamics of Brazilian Capitalism’. In Case Studies in 
the Origins of Capitalism, edited by Xavier Lafrance and Charles Post. London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2019. 
Cohen, Mark. ‘The Peasantry and Tenancy-Market Dependence: Rural Capitalism in Meiji-Era Japan’. In Case 
Studies in the Origins of Capitalism:, edited by Xavier Lafrance and Charles Post, 215–38. London: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2019. 
Comninel, George. ‘English Feudalism and the Origins of Capitalism’. Journal of Peasant Studies 27, no. 4 (2000): 
1–53. 
Haila, A. ‘The Theory of Land Rent at the Crossroads’. Environment and Planning D: Society and Space 8, no. 3 (1990): 
275–96.  
Isett, Christopher, and Stephen Miller. The Social History of Agriculture: From the Origins to the Current Crisis. Lanham: 
Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2016. 
Knafo, Samuel. ‘Critical Approaches and the Legacy of the Agent/Structure Debate in International Relations’. 
Cambridge Review of International Affairs, no. 23 (3) (2010). 
———. ‘Critical Methodology and the Problem of History’. In Critical Methods in Political and Cultural Economy, 
edited by Johnna Montgomerie, 94–100. London: Routledge, 2017. 
———. ‘Rethinking Neoliberalism after the Polanyian Turn’. Review of Social Economy, 2020, 1–26.  
———. ‘The Fetishizing Subject in Marx’s Capital’. Capital & Class 26, no. 1 (2002): 145–75. 
———. ‘The Gold Standard and the Origins of the Modern International Monetary System’. Review of International 
Political Economy 13, no. 1 (2006): 78–102.  
———. The Making of Modern Finance: Liberal Governance and the Gold Standard. London. Routledge, 2013. 
Knafo, Samuel, and Sahil Jai Dutta. ‘The Myth of the Shareholder Revolution and the Financialization of the 
Firm’. Review of International Political Economy 27, no. 3 (2019): 476–99.  
Knafo, Samuel, Sahil Jai Dutta, Richard Lane, and Steffan Wyn-Jones. ‘The Managerial Lineages of 
Neoliberalism’. New Political Economy 24, no. 2 (2019): 235–51.  
Post, Charles. ‘Comments on the Brenner–Wood Exchange on the Low Countries’. Journal of Agrarian Change, 
88–95, 2, no. 1 (2002). 
———. The American Road to Capitalism: Studies in Class-Structure, Economic Development and Political Conflict, 1620–
1877. Leiden: Brill, 2011. 
———. ‘The Use and Misuse of Uneven and Combined Development: A Critique of Anievas and Nişancıoğlu’. 
Historical Materialism 26, no. 3 (2018): 79–98. 
Post, Charles, George Souvlis, Sebastian Budgen, Jeremiah Gaster. ‘Class, Race and Capital-Centric Marxism: An 
Interview with Charlie Post’. Salvage, 2017. http://salvage.zone/online-exclusive/class-race-and-capital-
centric-marxism-an-interview-with-charlie-post/. 
Rosenberg, Justin. The Empire of Civil Society: A Critique of Realist Theory of International Relations. London: Verso, 
1994. 
———. ‘Why Is There No International Historical Sociology?’: European Journal of International Relations 12, no. 3 
(2006): 307–340.  
Salgado, Pedro. ‘The Transition Debate in Brazilian History: The Bourgeois Paradigm and Its Critique’. Journal of 
Agrarian Change, n.d. Accessed 26 January 2021. 
Steinmo, Sven, and Kathleen Thelen. Structuring Politics: Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Analysis. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1998. 
Streeck, Wolfgang, and Kathleen Thelen, eds. Beyond Continuity: Institutional Change in Advanced Political Economies. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005. 
Teschke, Benno. ‘Bourgeois Revolution, State Formation and the Absence of  the  International’. Historical 
Materialism 13, no. 2 (2005): 3–26. 
———. ‘IR Theory, Historical Materialism and the False Promise of International Historical Sociology Benno 
Teschke’. Spectrum: A Journal of Global Studies, 2014.  
———. The Myth of 1648: Class, Geopolitics, and the Making of Modern International Relations. London: Verso, 2003. 
———. ‘The Social Origins of 18th Century British Grand Strategy: A Historical Sociology of the Peace of 
Utrecht’. The 1713 Peace of Utrecht and Its Enduring Effects, 2019, 120–55.  
Teschke, Benno, and Hannes Lacher. ‘The Changing “Logics” of Capitalist Competition’. Cambridge Review of 
International Affairs 20, no. 4 (2007): 565–80.  
Teschke, Benno, George Souvlis, and Andry Aurélie. ‘Rethinking International Relations: An Interview with 
Benno Teschke’. Viewpoint Magazine, August 2016. 
https://www.viewpointmag.com/2016/08/18/rethinking-international-relations-an-interview-with-
benno-teschke/. 
Thompson, E. P. The Essential E. P. Thompson. New York: New Press, 2001. 
Wood, Ellen Meiksins. The Origin of Capitalism: A Longer View. London: Verso, 2002. 
———. ‘The Question of Market Dependence’. Journal of Agrarian Change 2, no. 1 (2002): 50–87. 
